Politike narodnosti: rađanje nove nacije? by Sánchez Madrid, Nuria Sánchez Madrid
FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO XXVIII (2), 2017.
318
Nuria Sánchez Madrid
Politics of Peoplehood: the Birth of a New Nation?
Abstract The political legitimation of nation states traditionally tended to claim 
homogeneity requirements that often exclude large sections of population. Taking 
this account of the traditional correspondence between nationality and state as 
a backdrop, I will attempt to sketch a new conception of peoplehood not based 
on class, race or religious membership, but on the acceptance of manifold social 
differences and on the construction of new belonging models. Basically I will 
suggest the exploration of new avenues of political research about the future of 
the nation with the following main goals: a) to argue for the persistence of 
differences among the members of a society at a global scale as a positive feature 
able to remove deep prejudices and biased views about the others, b) to highlight 
the prejudices that the neoliberal frame of the EU has supposed in the West 
Balkans area and c) to criticize the ideological resistance stemming from the idea 
of a nation state that usually turns down the birth of new nations in history as 
the result of wrongly solved conflicts. My claim for a politics of peoplehood as 
a regular source of conflicts and demands, which shouldn’t be viewed as a civil 
failure or breakdown, will be especially inspired by some texts from Seyla Benhabib, 
Slavoj Žižek and Lea Ypi focusing on the necessary updates that the conditions 
of membership and political participation ought to include in our current times.
Key words: Peoplehood, Partisanship, Populism, Republicanism, Orwell, Laclau; 
Ypi, Žižek, Benhabib
The political legitimation of nation states traditionally claimed ethnic or 
religious homogeneity as a requirement that systematically condemned to 
exclusion large sections of the population.1 Taking the aftermath of the tra-
ditional correspondence between the nation, people and the state as a back-
drop, I shall attempt to sketch a new conception of peoplehood not based 
on class, race or religious membership, but rather on the acceptance of the 
interdependence among manifold social and cultural differences and on the 
framing of new membership models. Basically, I will attempt to explore 
new avenues of political research regarding the future of nation with the 
1  This paper stems from a research funded by the following projects: Naturaleza hu-
mana y comunidad (III). ¿Actualidad del humanismo e inactualidad del hombre? (FFI2013- 
46815-P) and Retóricas del Clasicismo. Los puntos de vista (contextos, premisas, mentalidades) 
(FFI2013-41410-P), granted by the MINECO of the Government of Spain. A previous 
version of the paper was discussed at the workshop Politics of Enmity, held from 26th to 
28th September 2016 at the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory of the University 
of Belgrade. I am very grateful to the members of the Group for Social Engagement of 
that centre for their insightful remarks.
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following goals: a) to argue for acknowledging differences as a positive ac-
tion leading to the enhancement of local political membership on a global 
scale, b) to criticize the model that considers that the neoliberal state paves 
the way to political and social development, especially taking into account 
the Balkan peoples’ protests against this message and c) to present a new con-
ception of peoplehood as a hinge between society and partisan structures. 
The Differences We Belong to
One of the most deeply rooted prejudices about the forging of a nation re-
fers to national homogeneity and the feelings expressing cultural belonging, 
as if they were the aesthetic expression of a nation-embedded political de-
mand. It is a matter of fact that the modern framework of the nation-state 
is based on powerful images of enmity that charge the nation-state with the 
task of defending itself from other homologous political entities or poten-
tial internal separatist agents. Therefore the murmur of warfare lies under 
the foundations of the modern nation, but the postmodern constellation did 
not succeed in creating and consolidating a new political order free from this 
burden. As an example of this, my own country, Spain, officially acknowl-
edged four languages in the state aside Castilian with the advent of democ-
racy, but no governmental measures were taken to spread the knowledge of 
all these languages in our high schools, whose exams do not take them into 
any account, condemning them to minority and local status. People of my 
age from Madrid were forced to learn Catalan by their own means for ac-
cessing the worldly appreciated literature in this language. 
According to this hegemonic point of view, far from the Kantian hymns in 
favour of the rule of law across the surface of the Earth as the key to solving 
our problems, ethnic, religious and political confrontations surround us ev-
erywhere we move. Based on the conviction that social and cultural differ-
ences design the backdrop of concrete politics, I suggest we appraise their 
political scope by reading accurately an excerpt of a survey that George Or-
well carried out in the 1930s regarding mineworkers’ groups and their fam-
ilies in England. It highlights that the heterogeneous ways of life adopted by 
the members of different social layers should not prevent them to give birth 
to a common political protest. On the contrary, these different uses are in-
tended to lead them to the only path open to aggregating common forces 
with the aim of defending against shared enemies. Orwell does not hesitate 
to identify this enemy with the economic exploitation of all workers and 
with the on-going pressure of failure experienced by the called middle class: 
“[I]f you are constantly bullying me about my ‘bourgeois ideology’, if you 
give me to understand that in some way I am an inferior person because I 
have never worked with my hands, you will only succeed in antagonizing 
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me. For you are telling me either that I am inherently useless or that I ought 
to alter myself in some way that is beyond my power. I cannot proletarian-
ize my accent or certain of my tastes and beliefs, and I would not if I could. 
Why should I? I don’t ask anybody else to speak my dialect; why should 
anybody else ask me to speak it? It would be far better to take those mis-
erable class-stigmata for granted and emphasize them as little as possible. 
They are comparable to a race-difference, and experience shows that one 
can cooperate with foreigners, even with foreigners whom one dislikes, 
when it is really necessary. Economically, I am in the same boat with the 
miner, the navvy, and the farmhand: lay the emphasis on that and I will 
fight with them. Culturally, I am different from the miner, the navvy, and 
the farmhand: lay the emphasis on that and you may arm me against them. 
[…] The weakness of the middle class hitherto has lain in the fact that they 
have never learned to combine; but if you frighten them into combining 
against you, you may find that you have raised up a devil” (G. Orwell, The 
Road to Wigan Pier (1937), Penguin Books, 1978, pp. 201-202). 
Here we have an example of a political union stemming from the acknowl-
edgment of multiple related demands. Orwell forces the reader to acknowl-
edge that behind every political strategic agreement lays a stubborn disagree-
ment regarding the sources of value that each group considers part of their 
identity. Yet this should not discard an effective cooperation grounded on 
the basis of shared damages. This seems not very far from Ernesto Laclau’s 
claims for making the notion of totality more a horizon than a ground pre-
vious to the emergence of a political project.2 In this context I agree that re-
moving the blindfold that prevents the subjects from noticing a common 
social suffering will help them discover unexpected political partners. Yet, I 
am not arguing for the retrieving of an alleged civic virtue such as tolerance 
to deal with the alleged negative effects that heterogeneity has for collective 
coexistence and cohabitation. Kant already spoke in his What is Enlightenment 
2  “Not a Ground but a Horizon: An Interview with Ernesto Laclau, Brian Price and 
Meghan Sutherland”, World Picture 1 (2008), http://www.worldpicturejournal.com/WP_2/
PDF%20Docs/LaclauPDF.pdf (viewed 1 September, 2016): “So the answer to this difficul-
ty is to be found, in my view, in the notion of a particular object which, without ceasing to 
be particular, transforms its body through the process of representing (indeed, of con-
structing) that impossible object: the totality. The latter is, stricto sensu, incompatible with 
the particularity that incarnates it. This is the empty or hegemonic signifier. I have written 
that we are here in a situation comparable to that of the Kantian noumenon: an object that 
shows itself though the impossibility of its adequate representation. The obvious difference 
from Kant is that the noumenon has a precise identity, even if it is that of a Regulative Idea, 
and that the task that this Idea prescribes, although it is infinite, has a direction established 
from the beginning. However, in the case of the empty signifier there is no such unidirec-
tionality: everything depends on the contingent process through which a certain particu-
larity claims to be the locus of the universal. This particularity, in its universal role of 
representing the totality, works as the limit of what is representable in a certain space. 
Actually, it constitutes the latter; it is in this sense that it is a horizon and not a ground”.
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about “the presumptuous title of tolerance”, which Goethe and Mirabeau 
also viewed in the XIX century as an insult and a temporary attitude, that 
should evolve into a full recognition of the values of others. I share Brown’s 
misgivings about this virtue pervaded by a depoliticizing function, since it 
often fulfils a hegemonic judgment that does not need to be reviewed in turn 
through the process of toleration. Against Rainer Forst’s appraisal of toler-
ation as a concrete practice of justice, which prevents the person who holds 
an objection from transforming it into a rejection, as it considers the rejec-
tion to be an unfair deed, Brown has denounced in a Foucauldian sense the 
hegemony grammar in action in this behaviour: 
“How does tolerance discourse today recentre certain hegemonic norms? 
What hegemonic norm, for example, lurks in the formulation ‘I’m against 
gay marriage but I’m for tolerance’? What hegemonic norm is recentred 
when Europeans or Americans speak of being tolerant towards Arabs, 
Muslims, or immigrants? What norm of the ethnic nation is circulated by 
the ostensibly liberal and inclusive utterance? How does tolerance hide and 
sometimes even legitimate existing violence in the societies that it gov-
erns? In short, I’m concerned with the ways that contemporary discourses 
of tolerance comprise a set of normative operations that often hide them-
selves as such” (Blasi/Holzhey, 2014: 20). 
Instead of dwelling on the production of stigmatized, ‘non-normal’ identities 
– as the not-heterosexual or the not-nationalist – toleration, I find it more 
useful politically to fly as a banner the unknown ground that leads different 
people to an unexpected pragmatic and actual consensus. Even if I do not 
agree with all the features entailed by the “unchosen condition” which But-
ler has repeatedly argued for, I believe that social and political cooperation 
should not depend on emotional upheavals, but on the consciousness and 
perception of an insurmountable interdependency that inspires our actions 
regarding the public goods we share: 
[I]t is not from pervasive love for humanity or a pure desire for peace that 
we strive to live together. We live together because we have no choice, and 
though we sometimes rail against that unchosen condition, we remain 
obligated to struggle to affirm the ultimate value of that unchosen social 
world, and affirmation that is not quite a choice, a struggle that makes it-
self known and felt precisely when we exercise freedom in a way that is 
necessarily committed to the equal value of lives (Butler, 2015: 122). 
The context of the quoted text claims that the equal exposure to precarity and 
the consciousness of interdependency are preconditions for the good life and 
thus contribute to make possible the political appearance at a global scale. As 
Butler has repeatedly highlighted, the unsought We that we are determines 
our political subjectivity before we dispose of the tools able to scrutinize it. 
Popular protests could not be understood without first making the street a 
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house of the people, where the “I” discovers that she is also a “we” and thus 
that an unchosen plural condition precedes her and provides all her actions 
with a sound basis. Even if precarity stamps its hallmark on human bodies3, 
Butler asserts that it also enables an unexpected community to come into 
view by the means of a “pre-contractual interdependency” that guides the 
search of values for defending an equal life. Given this account of interde-
pendency, it will not sound odd that the body fulfils in Butler an overriding 
role compared to the human discourse, a feature of this discourse that leads 
“towards alternative versions of universality that are wrought from the work 
of translation itself”.4 According to Butler, the language of a gathered popu-
lation should not be confounded with or reduced to the language of auton-
omy and dominance. It should rather acknowledge the unfailing labour of 
translations and transactions as its unavoidable task. Thus, the discussion 
about the aesthetics of the thereness formed by a protesting assembly allows 
the drawing of the conclusion that the struggle for social and ethical rec-
ognition is always a contingent feature that should take distance from the 
constraints of an identitarian project and redistribute the terms established 
by the dominant discourse,5 since hegemonic social discourses usually con-
demn to oblivion those identities that do not meet the standard guidelines. 
An interesting point here hints at the borders of translation itself, t.i. at the 
limits of benefits stemming from the making of mutual comprehension a 
sacred social value. Diametrically opposed to transparency, real understand-
ing at a psychological, social and political level should better admit that a 
background made of darkness, fuzziness and impotence from the point of 
view of modern autonomy patterns rules the whole process. Hence common 
commitments and participation should not lose their effectiveness for avow-
ing their incapability to shape a universal subject which should overcome 
the manifold differences. On the contrary, I claim that the coming political 
projects have to overcome the traditional frame of class divisions without 
forgetting that it survives disguised in cultural and social heterogeneities. 
Without remembering this, we might take the risk of hurriedly building up 
a fetishized and filmy image of the community we really belong to. 
The Neoliberal State has no Enemies? The Balkan Case.
As is well known, the advent of liberal capitalism in the former Yugoslavia 
did not solve poverty and underdevelopment problems. On the contrary, a 
deep dependency on foreign capital and waning sovereignty and democracy 
were the flipside of the economic and political liberalization coming after 
3  See on this issue Lorey (2015).
4  Butler/Laclau/Žižek (2000: 179).
5  Butler/Laclau/Žižek (2000: 168).
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the fall of the Yugoslav socialist model, as last decades have largely shown. 
This paradoxical phenomenon deserves an accurate analysis, which will also 
uncover the internal incoherencies of the EU political patterns and of the 
blames spread by the International Monetary Fund regarding the long cri-
sis of most post-Yugoslav states. Furthermore, it should be accurately eval-
uated whether the current understanding of the nation state has become an 
exercise of a kind of populism without the people, charged with the task of 
preparing more and more people to passively abandon themselves to neo-
liberal anarchism. In this context I quite sympathize with the proposals for 
creating a Balkan federation6 – an ancient model exalted for especially sen-
sitive areas even by the conservative Hannah Arendt –p strong enough to 
free the former Yugoslav region from external dependency and to exorcise 
the ghost of ancient Serbian hegemony, to maximize the welfare of its citi-
zens and emancipate them politically. To give a clear example of the changes 
that this proposal would entail, nationalising banks and industry and giving 
back economic control to producers and local communities might grant the 
governments of the Balkan area the power to even internal inequalities and 
to foster development, a horizon currently discarded by the diligent advi-
sors of the troika. Andrea Živković coined this path as the purpose “to make 
a transition from the transition”7, t.i. to take a critical distance from the nar-
ration used to approach the development difficulties that the countries in 
this region are facing. Naturally, this picture has neither helped to strength-
en the civil society there nor to give a response to neoliberal hegemony. Yet 
from Laclau’s and Mouffe’s contributions for assessing populist power we 
are conscious about the achievements that political ontology and its mobility 
may attain. The engagement of heterogeneous actors appears as a key point 
for overcoming a post-communist regime stage that has hindered since the 
’90 any serious attempt to establish and make set in motion a real state of 
right, one that would not remain dead letter: 
“In order to understand the post-communist, eternal transitional predic-
ament, and especially the current political and economic situation in the 
Balkans, we suggest that one has to go beyond the analysis of the state, 
its failures and weaknesses, and engage with the concept of regime. The 
post-socialist regime is a conglomerate grouping political elites, attaches 
businesses and their Western partners, media corporations, NGOs pro-
moting the holy couple of electoral democracy and neoliberal economy, 
organised crime (itself intimately related to political and economic elites), 
predatory foreign-owned banks and, finally, a corrupt judiciary and con-
trolled unions” (Igor Stiks and Srecko Horvat, “Radical Politics in the Des-
ert of Transition”, in Id. (eds.), 2015: 16-17). 
6  Vd. A. Zivkovic/D. Plavsic (eds.) (2003).
7  A. Zivkovic, “From the Market … to the Market: The Debt Economy After Yugosla-
via”, in Igor Stiks and Srecko Horvat (2015: 64).
324
POLITICS OF PEOPLEhOOd: ThE BIRTh OF A NEw NATION?Nuria SáNchez Madrid
As Stiks and Horvat argue in the above cited book, EU authorities seemed 
to focus their political role on encouraging the former Yugoslav countries 
to replace the former institutional and statist structures by an awful regime, 
without hesitating to reduce both discursively and empirically the region 
to the Pandora’s box of mythical forces –nationalism, racism, xenophobia–, 
which they considered to have definitely erased from European social imag-
inaries. Yet scholars such as Tanja Petrović argued that, on the contrary, the 
EU suffers similar symptoms that it is not disposed to recognize as a com-
mon burden shared with Western Balkans.8 This kind of discourse hardly 
manages to conceal the European desire to keep its own threats outside its 
borders, which entails the propensity to leave the Balkans beyond them. 
This usual European appraisal has been rejected more than a decade ago by 
É. Balibar in the following terms:
Either Europe will recognize in the Balkans situation not a monstrosity 
grafted to its breast, a pathological ‘after effect’ of underdevelopment or of 
communism, but rather an image or effect of its own history, and will un-
dertake to confront it and resolve it and thus to put itself into question and 
transform itself. Only then will Europe probably begin to become possible 
again. Or else it will refuse to come face-to-face with itself and will con-
tinue to treat the problem as an exterior obstacle to be overcome through 
exterior means, including colonization (Balibar, 2004: 6).
Balibar’s quote is as challenging as ever at the momento, since supervision 
and colonization have become in the new century the lure bringing the Eu-
ropean ‘future’ to Balkan countries and thus a clear message conveyed to the 
actual or possible candidates for EU membership. Thus we have returned 
to a mixed narration that makes of European periphery the bulwark pro-
tecting Europe from barbaric enemies, but at the same time dreads the full 
reception of countries that fall outside the longed union and sees them as a 
part of the no man’s land of the needful border. As Slavoj Žižek highlighted 
in the ’90: “every actor […] endeavours to legitimize her place “inside” [Eu-
rope] by presenting itself as the last bastion of European civilization […] in 
the face of oriental barbarism”.9 In this vein Herfried Münkler claimed in his 
book Empires10 that Europe, as every imperial power, would have borrowed 
from the imperial model the ‘civilising’ stage that should complete its expan-
sion and consolidation using borders as one more military mean and thus 
condemning the Balkans to a kind of elusive inclusion. As Wendy Brown 
has pointed out, the multiplication of walls, imagined or factual, belongs to 
8  Petrovic, “On the Way to Europe”, in Horvat/Stiks (eds.) (2015: 119ss.)
9  Žižek, “Caught in Another’s Dream in Bosnia”, in (R. Ali/L. Lifschultz, 1993: 236). 
Cfr. The concept of ‘nesting orientalisms’ by Milica Bakić-Hayden (1995).
10  Münckler (2007: 167)
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a conception of sovereignty where the discourse about national safety and 
the fear against a fuzzy enmity become key points:
Viewed as a form of national psychic defense, walls can be seen as an ideo-
logical disavowal of a set of unmanageable appetites, needs, and powers. 
They facilitate a set of metalepses in which the specter of invasion re-
places internal need or desire and the specter of violent hostility replac-
es reckoning with colonial displacements and occupation. Through their 
ostentatious signification of sovereign power and definition of the nation, 
they also deflect anxieties about the disintegration of national identity and 
about the decline of state sovereignty (Brown, 2010: 130).
The fairy tales of an idealized discourse of transition, whose aftermath the 
Balkan people have in fact felt since the ’90s became a mainstream narra-
tive in post-socialist states of Eastern Europe undergoing transition with the 
purpose to leave out of the political market alternative paths to access the 
European Union. This narrative needed to discursively reduce the region 
into a place requiring permanent external support and supervision to get 
completely pacified and to get acquainted with democratic patterns. As the 
former and unforgettable EU enlargement commissioner, Oli Rehn, claimed 
in plain language, the painful measures taken in these countries should not 
lead its people to feel “as ‘takers’ of externally imposed conditions, but rath-
er as ‘makers’ of their own future”.11 In this context deregulation, unfettered 
markets, cuts of social spending and similar measures appeared in the Bal-
kan public space as the most promising toolbox against the burden of eth-
nic and nationalist conflicts. Yet reality has proven how far from the truth 
was the mantra telling that liberalization of economic policies would ade-
quately prepare the path of access to the EU. Actually, high unemployment, 
widespread corruption and low levels of trust in the political class depress 
a society that feels betrayed and heavily disappointed by the promises of a 
monitored transition. 
As is often the case in extreme crisis, this situation also reveals chances to 
build new counter-hegemonic political subjectivities through social upheav-
als, as some worker and student protests display. Thus groups of common 
people “learn – as Žižek has stressed – the art of recognizing, from an en-
gaged subjective position, elements which are here, in our space, but whose 
time is the emancipated future”.12 This will, in my view, open up new avenues 
to re-frame the nation state and attempt to stop the current global condi-
tion of the nation states being subjected to economic powers. As Igor Štiks 
11  Rehn, 17 April 2008 (internet), available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/search-result.
htm?sort=typeId&page=1250&query=18&direction=ASC&locale=EN&size=50 (viewed 
1 September, 2016)
12  Žižek (2012: 128).
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and Srećko Horvat have highlighted in “The Future of Radical Politics in the 
Balkans – Protests, Plenums, Parties” (Verso, 2015: 261ss.), non-institution-
al forms of organization and action have replaced in all Europe the function 
of the motor of social and political development supposed to be fulfilled by 
the alleged EU institutional map and agenda. Both authors hint to the 2014 
worker’s protests that started in Tuzla, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and quickly 
spread from there to other Bosnian cities, with the aim of demanding unpaid 
salaries and pensions, which quickly spread to include students and other 
professionals, focusing on the fact that 
[m]ost canton governments resigned and the canton assemblies mostly 
accepted the main demands of the plenums – although their implemen-
tation remains another issue. After long deliberations open to all citizens, 
almost uniformly, although with some regional variety, they demanded 
the revision of privatisations, and end to politicians’ excessive benefits, 
and the formation of the new state-level and local governments made up 
of people with proven expertise and no record of corruption (Stiks/Hor-
vat, 2015: 262).
The plenum movement in Bosnia showed that spontaneous assemblies of a 
disappointed citizenship proved to be more effective in articulating popu-
lar demands and retrieving democratic control over people’s lives than the 
bulk of measures recommended by EU advisers. Moreover, the participants’ 
multilevel belonging of in such social phenomena deeply collided with the 
purposes of ethno-nationalist political elites, since they also proved that eco-
nomic precariousness might bring about the firmest social cohesion. Nat-
urally, the plenums could not last forever and they disbanded, as the most 
common political experience would have predicted. Yet they lasted long 
enough to redefine the public sphere and to influence the scheduled and 
supervised agenda devoted for the region, fulfilling the role that in the En-
lightenment time Kant had assigned to the “historical sign” in The Conflict of 
the Faculties, t.i. a token capable to prove that history might evolve to more 
hopeful horizons. Thus between protests and plenums arises a connection 
comparable with Kantian intuitions and concepts, as – following Štiks and 
Horvat – “[w]ithout the protests, the plenums would lose their capacity to 
apply pressure, and without the plenums, the protests would lose their legit-
imacy and articulation” (2015: 263). Put differently, the theory’s normative 
ground should learn from contemporary social practices that put ordinary 
people in the centre of the visibility and the political agenda, ensuring that 
their voice matters. Yet, as Micah White, one of the founders of the Occupy 
movement stressed with respect to the above, people “get burned out”, so 
that political forces that aim to get into power ought to sing the unavoid-
able carpe diem:
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You can’t maintain that exponential growth forever; people get burned 
out […] That sudden peaking has to somehow be locked in, some way of 
giving it a structure that is able to persist. Looking at where we need to 
go today in terms of social movements, we need to be able to combine the 
sudden peaking of a social movement with the ability to create structures 
that give it permanence. That’s why I talk a lot about the hybridization 
between social movements and political parties.13 
This perception of the simultaneously strong and vulnerable contingent na-
ture of popular demonstrations should inspire political initiatives prepared 
to leave a more enduring impact in the Balkan societies and able to success-
fully take part in the polls, conscious that social movements offer a more re-
liable basis to coach partisanship for the complex dialectics of the present. 
Taking into account these examples of Balkan social movements, I shall de-
vote the last section to the intersections between partisanship and people-
hood, a subject that Lea Ypi accurately dissected in last years. 
The State after the Neoliberal Collapse of Nation:  
the Politics of Peoplehood
As Judith Butler pointed out in last year’s visit to the Institute for Philosophy 
and Social Theory in Belgrade, it would be useful to remember in political 
theory that the “sovereign is not necessarily a figure of indivisible unity or 
a master figure. […] Sovereignty can be divisible; it can even be dispersed”.14 
This claim reminds the politicians that the conditions of appearance pre-
cede the making of political agenda. It could be a good starting point for 
re-framing pluralism, understood as a form of cohabiting in ways that force 
the subjects to acknowledge difference, but also make them feel committed 
to the obligatory cohabitation with others. According to Butler, without 
sovereignty it is very hard to defend the very important concept of political 
self-determination that is needed in the struggle for decolonization and en-
couraging general political emancipation from external powers, but the sov-
ereignty she is searching for diverges from ancient early modern patterns, as 
it moves from “a constitutive unfreedom”15 that reminds us of the inability 
to choose with whom we cohabit the earth. The ideal of sovereignty at stake 
here is no more a vertical one, but it is based on a radical horizontality. I will 
13  “The Challenge of Protest in Our Time: Micah White on Social Change Movements, 
Theories of Revolution, and Moving on from Occupy Wall Street”, Los Angeles Review 
of Books, 17 September 2015 (access 10th September 2016): https://lareviewofbooks.
org/interview/the-challenge-ofprotest- in-our-time-micah-white-on-social-change-
movements-theories-of-revolution-andmoving-on-from-occupy-wall-street/.
14  Seminar on Judith Butler’s “Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly”, 
Responses to Athena Athanasiou, Adriana Zaharijević , Vedran Džihić (2016: 89).
15  See Butler (2014: 176).
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claim that the transition from a model of politics controlled by an oligarchy 
of parties to a partisanship responsive to the requirements and demands of 
peoplehood occupies the centre of the map of the new sovereignty that Eu-
rope is searching for. I am not claiming that institutional structures ought 
to be replaced by continuous plenums. Moreover it should be highlighted 
that the geography of the plenum movement strongly suggests that it in fact 
they did not transcend ethnic divisions, but remained mainly confined to the 
Muslim population. Even if Croatian population was involved in a lesser de-
gree, the second largest community, that of the Serbs, was almost completely 
absent from these protests. It is not my aim to idealize the plenums formu-
la, but rather to claim that the lack of communication among institutions, 
parties and society largely led to a political collapse in Europe, entailing a 
hard decreasing of legitimacy of institutional actors across the continent. I 
would like to take as a leitmotiv the claim raised by Rancière in his book Dis-
agreement: Philosophy and Politics, where he explains that: 
There is politics from the moment there exists the sphere of appearance of 
a subject, the people, whose particular attribute is to be different from itself, 
internally divided. So, from the political point of view, the inscriptions of 
equality that figure in the Declaration of the Rights of Man or the pream-
bles to the Codes and Constitutions, those that symbolize such and such 
an institution or are engraved on the pediments of their edifices, are not 
“forms” belied by their contents or “appearances” made to conceal reality. 
They are an effective mode of appearance of the people, the minimum of 
quality that is inscribed in the field of common experience. The problem 
is not to accentuate the difference between this existing quality and all that 
belies it. It is not to contradict appearances but, on the contrary, to confirm 
them. Wherever the part of those who have no part is inscribed, however 
fragile and fleeting these inscriptions may be, a sphere of appearance of 
the demos is created, an element of the kratos, the power of the people, ex-
ists. The problem is to extend the sphere of this appearance, to maximize 
this potential (Rancière, 1999: 87-88). 
I agree with Rancière’s remark about the need to let the appearances to raise 
their claims, which confirms what I consider to be the key task of our time, 
especially in the European area, due to the historical contribution it yielded 
to the establishment of sound political frames, t.i. the integration of social 
movements criteria in the structures encompassing traditional partisanship. 
Actually partisanship is a long-term activity, requiring endurance and con-
stancy, but the established parties’ organization seems to be more obedient 
to the powers that the constitutionalist Luigi Ferrajoli called savage than to 
their affiliated membership. I hold misgivings against the populist tenden-
cy to reduce a political party to a tool in search for hegemony, as I consider 
that such political agent ought to aspire to consciously influence and shape 
public opinion, instead of just mirroring the changeable moods of a social 
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group. In the words of a very stimulating article of Lea Ypi and Jonathan 
White: “The ‘median voter’, if there is such a thing, is not what a party must 
chase but what it must help to define”.16 The hope they show in relation to 
Corbyn’s Labour leadership and the attempted Corbexit suggests that a new 
politics of peoplehood is coming.17 A slew of symptoms confirm it decidedly. 
In a nutshell, traditional political structures will find it much more difficult to 
remain deaf before the voices of the street, which does not entail that spon-
taneity and common fight against a shared precarity might entirely replace 
the conventional political paths. Populist non conservative movements fulfil 
the function of reminding the states of the tenets of a welfare society and the 
large list of tasks they have abandoned for managing more profitable goals. 
Beside this, I consider it useful to stress the difference between right and left 
populisms, since I claim that radical democracy is embedded in a deep emo-
tional ambivalence. Briefly said, Laclau’s floating signifier would easily admit 
catchwords such as “clean institutions”, “safety” and “ethnic nationalism”, so 
that this wide range of possible mottos framing figures of the people should 
excite our reflection about the shortcomings of political movements based 
only on the work made at the street. This ambivalence also highlights that 
the real Otherness of the neoliberal state is not democracy, which otherwise 
it views as a reliable and pliable partner, but the republican modern Europe-
an tradition starting with Kantian Enlightenment. This tradition shares with 
the contemporary reconstructions of Marxism the conception of a state as 
the outcome of a long-term chain of demands and struggles among social 
classes, according to Poulantzas’ words, as “a relationship of forces, or more 
precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes 
and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a necessari-
ly specific form”.18 Yet according to this view the state will not reduce itself 
to a mere mediator in class struggle, it will also demand the expansion of 
citizenship rights beyond ethnic or nationalist requirements. Hence we are 
claiming for a state committed to meet the goals of a cosmopolitanism for 
16  White/Ypi (2016: 33).
17  White/Ypi (2016: 33): “What the process that brought to Corbyn to the head of the 
Labour Party did was question the model of parties as electoral machines and raise a 
larger set of issues about their democratic function. It gave reminder that a party prop-
erly understood is a community of principles, where people with broadly similar values, 
commitments and conceptions of justice make common decisions, take joint risks and 
distribute collective responsibility for how they want to shape future political life. Those 
who voted for Corbyn voted against the personalisation of politics, against a model of 
the party exclusively focused on the image and media appeal of the leader, and against 
an exclusive emphasis on how elections can be won. They voted to reappropriate the 
radical roots of the Labour party as an agent of social transformation, guided by a process 
where everyone, not just the leader, is understood to be responsible for the final outcome”.
18  Poulantzas (1978: 128-129).
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de-colonized times. The republican tradition would not thus tolerate to see 
the public authority of the state reduced to one more agent encompassed by 
the global market, but would rather encourage the state to get autonomous-
ly involved in this all-pervading sphere of the global market to argue for the 
rights of people. If one understands democracy as a political system where 
everything is subjected to agreement, I have my doubts about the chances 
that a state ruled by right will have in the case it is forced to obtain the con-
sensus of neoliberal powers19, since either that goal will never be attained or 
it will become real with heavy constraints.
Conclusions
In this paper I argued for revising rooted frames of the nation as an homog-
enized whole that in my view yield no more benefits for a political actor 
committed to solve the problems of our present. According to my claims, 
the only differences that should concern a state are related to social and 
economic inequalities, but they do not stem at all from the fact that people 
speak different languages or practice different religions. On the contrary, 
ethnic and religious conflicts might become the best instruments for divert-
ing people’s attention from their real problems. Thus I claim for gaining a 
new conception of peoplehood, which should overcome the gap between re-
cent radical-democratic conceptions of peoplehood (Laclau, Butler, Brown) 
that seem to fetishize to some extent attributes such as plurality, heteroge-
neity and populism, on the one hand, and the liberal or republican institu-
tional frames that put too much emphasis on the homogeneity, rationality 
and transparency of political actors on the other. In my view, a republi-
canism conscious of the challenges of the XXIth Century should make of 
the politics made on the streets one of its best tools for grounding a sound 
civil culture, but always taking into account that these radical democratic 
strategies should not conceal nationalist of racist claims. Hence a politics 
of peoplehood committed with the boost of civil freedom should intend to 
remove the blindfold that prevents – as it happened in the countries of the 
European area through the enlargement process of EU – a clear perception 
of the forces that abducted and were disguised as a state of right. Unfortu-
nately, the EU institutional frame did not choose the side of law and order, 
but it took the easier way to become an actor under the pressure of global 
economic powers. It is a matter of fact that most European society of today 
has difficulties to view the European institutions as the solution for their 
real problems. In this large context, some examples of politics on the streets 
19  É. Balibar has tackled this issue in several works, see Citizenship (2015: 128): “We 
must return to the idea that a force or a political movement can only democratize society 
if it itself is fundamentally more democratic that the system it opposes, with respect both 
to its objectives and to its internal operation”.
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made in different countries from the ex-Yugoslavia work as reminder of the 
tasks that need to be accomplished in order to improve the political maturity 
in the whole European area, but especially in the Balkans, which gave in the 
past great examples and formulas regarding the coexistence and cohesion 
of plural cultures and nations. 
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Politike narodnosti: rađanje nove nacije? 
Apstrakt
Politička legitimizacija nacionalnih država tradicionalno je imala tendenciju da 
propisuje uslove homogenosti koji često isključuju velike delove stanovništva. 
Uzevši u obzir ovu tradicionalnu korespodenciju između nacionalnosti i države 
kao podlogu, pokušaću da skiciram novu koncepciju narodnosti koja nije zasno-
vana na klasi, rasi i verskoj pripadnosti, već na prihvatanju mnogobrojnih druš-
tvenih razlika i konstrukciji novih modela pripadnosti. U suštini, ja ću predložiti 
ispitivanje novih staza političkih studija o budućnosti nacije sa sledećim glavnim 
ciljevima: a) kako bih izneo tvrdnju da je opstajanje razlika između članova druš-
tva na globalnoj skali pozitivno svojstvo sposobno da ukloni duboke predrasude 
i pristrasnost prema drugima, b) da bih podvukao kako neoliberalni okvir EU is-
poljava izvesne predrasude prema prostoru Zapadnog Balkana i c) kako bih kri-
tikovao ideološki otpor koji proizlazi iz ideje nacionalne države koja uglavnom 
odbacuje rođenje nove nacije u istoriji kao rezultat pogrešno razrešenog sukoba. 
Moje zalaganje za politiku narodnosti kao regularni izvor nasilja i zâhteva, koje 
ne treba videti kao neuspeh ili slom građanske opcije, biće posebno inspirisana 
nekim tekstovima Šejle Benhabib (Seyla Benhabib), Slavoja Žižeka (Slavoj Žižek) 
i Lee Epi (Lea Ypi) čiji je fokus na neophodnim osavremenjivanjima koja bi uslovi 
pripadnosti i političke participacije trebalo da uključe u današnjem vremenu.
Ključne reči: Narodnost, partizani, populizam, republikanizam, Orvel, Laklau, Jpi, 
Žižek, Benhabib
